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Abstract
This article reviews the nature of intellectual property rights in agriculture and outlines a modeling
framework that accounts for relevant institutional features of agricultural R&D. The analysis emphasizes
vertical market linkages in a model where agricultural innovations adopted by farmers are produced
upstream by input suppliers. It is argued that the conventional assumption of competitive pricing in the
rest of the economy cannot hold when new technologies are produced by private firms, because such
innovationsare typically protected by intellectual property rights (such as patents) which confer (limited)
monopoly rights to the discoverer. The implications of intellectual property rights for the welfare
evaluation of agricultural R&D are derived, and it is shown that conventional methods usually
overestimate the welfare gains from agricultural innovations.
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Intellectual Property Rights and the Welfare Effects ofAgricultural R&D
The profound changes that have affected the agricultural sector of developed countries in modern
times are perhaps best illustrated by the evolution of production techniques. Mechanization, new
chemical inputs such as herbicides, pesticides and fertilizers, genetic selection of crops and animals, new
crop varieties, and countless other technical and organizational improvements have allowed a generalized
increase in physical output while, at the same time, agriculture suffered a massive exodus of labor forces
towards the non-farm sectors. Indeed, one of the stylized facts of developed countries post-war growth is
that productivity in agriculture has grown faster than that of other sectors (Jorgenson andGpllop). This
remarkable record naturally begs the question of what is at its root, and a view that commands
considerable consensus is that agricultural productivity growth is due to (past) investments in scientific
research and development (R&D).
Following the early work of Griliches (1958), a number of studies have analyzed economic issues
related to the effects of agricultural research. We cannot begin to do justice to this impressive collection
of contributions, but fortunately two recent texts can fill that need (Alston, Norton andPardey; Huffman
and Evenson, 1993). A central issue in this setting concerns the measurement of the size and distribution
ofthe economic benefits from the technical progress that stems fi*om agricultural R&D. A large majority
of studies has relied on measuring changes in the economic surplus (consumer and producer surplus)
evaluated in the agricultural product market. The basic idea is that improved production techniques allow
farmers to supply a larger amount ofoutput for any given price level, i.e., we have a productivity-induced
supply shift. A prototype model is represented in figure 1, where iS'o(p) represents the pre-innovation
supply curve, S^{p) represents the post-innovation supply curve, and D{p) is the demand curve. For
this closed-economy partial-equilibrium framework, area^BCD is conventionally taken as measuring the
increase in economic surplus, what isoften called the "gross annual research benefit."
2To be sure, a number of issues have been noted in the context of this measurement problem. First of
all, although the analytical framework of virtually all previous empirical studies can be reduced to a
version of the model in figure 1 (as illustrated in Alston, Norton, and Pardey), the specific assumptions
have changed from study to study.1 Second, the consumer surplus portion of thewelfare metric strictly
applies only if there are no income effects. Third, the welfare interpretation of the producer surplus
portion of the measurement hinges on exactly what supply functions are represented by curves Si{p)
(/=0,1) (i.e., what is being held constant in the analysis). This last point may be related to the validity of
the partial equilibrium nature of the model, but there is widespread belief that the relevant research
benefits can be measured in the output market using equilibrium demand and supply curves of sufficient
generality.2 In any case, it is understood that the validity of these welfare measures presupposes
optimality conditions in the rest of the economy (i.e., competitive pricing conditions everywhere and no
missing markets).
In this article we focus on this last point and we argue that, under circumstances that are becoming
increasingly important for agricultural innovations in theUnited States, the competitive price conditions
underlying the measurement in figure 1 cannot be invoked. Essentially, the traditional model discussed
above pertains to innovations that are the result of public scientific research and that are physically
provided either directly by the government or by competitive agents. As documented byHuffman and
Evenson (1993), and by Alston, Norton and Pardey, much of the past research in agriculture has been of
1For example, some studies have calculated agricultural R&D benefits conditional on agiven input
bundle (e.g., Griliches, 1964), whereas others have allowed for the optimal input mix toadjust while
holding fixed input and output prices (e.g., Huffman and Evenson, 1989; Chavas and Cox). Yet others
have.also allowed output price to adjust as in figure 1(e.g., Zachariah, Fox, and Brinkman), but with
input prices again held constant.
2 See Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995, p. 232). This claim is based on the work ofJust and Hueth
and Just, Hueth and Schmitz although it is recognized that the "consumer" or "producer" surplus
interpretation ofwelfare measures may beproblematic insome cases. See also Thurman.
3this nature. This has certainly been the case, for example, for many research activities carried out by the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and by land grant universities. Indeed, the atomistic
structure of agricultural production explains why virtually none of the relevant R&D is carried out by
farms directly engaged in production, and this structure has sometimes been cited as a reason for the need
for publicly funded research in agriculture. When agricultural innovations are solely due to the research
efforts of a benevolent public authority, then the simple model represented in figure I may be appropriate
to value the social benefits of such research (subject to the other caveats mentioned earlier).
Whereas publicly sponsored research institutions have been and are actively involved in agricultural
research, it is a fact that a sizable (and increasing) portion of agricultural R&D is performed by private
fuTTis that typically supply inputs to agriculture. The innovations produced by private firms are usually
protected by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), such as patents, which confer monopoly rights to the
discoverer (with some limitations). Furthermore, in an environment of declining public support for state
universities, patent protection is now being routinely sought for many innovations developed by land
grant universities in an effort to increase revenue from non-traditional sources. Of course, protection of
intellectual property has social benefits, and a patent system has long been recognized as useful in
providing incentives to innovators given the public good nature of R&D output (knowledge). But what
this means is that, as part of the socio-institutional setting of knowledge production, one needs to
recognize that agents endowed with monopoly rights (as conferred by patents) will exploit them. Thus,
insofar as agricultural innovations are protected by IPR, then the competitive price conditions underlying
the measurement in figure I cannot be invoked. As shown in this paper, this observation can drastically
change the anal>lic framework for evaluating the size and the distribution of the benefits from
agricultural innovations.
The article is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the nature of IPR for agricultural
innovations, and discuss the increasing importance of private R&D for U.S. agriculture. We then propose
4a formal model of new technology diffusion that captures the essential features of many agricultural
innovations. The welfare measures appropriate for this model are derived, for both the instances of
drastic and non-drastic innovations, and they are compared with the traditional measures that are relevant
for publicly produced innovations. Finally, the results of a simulation exercise illustrate the quantitative
effects of correctly accounting for IPR on the size anddistribution of welfaregains.
Intellectual Property Rights and Agricultural R&D
The principle of protecting the products of human ingenuity so as to create incentives for
inventiveness andprogress has long been recognized in the legal system ofmost countries. In theUnited
States this protection takes the form of patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets (Besen and
Raskind). The patent right is perhaps the most powerful means of protecting intellectual property,
essentially endowing the patent holder with monopoly rights on the innovative product/process for a
limited time period (usually 17 years). Not all of the inputs into agricultural production fall within the
statutory domain of utility patents. In particular, because patents are not meant to apply to 'products of
nature,' the output of agronomic and biological research was for a long time offered a different kind of
intellectual property protection (Kjeldgaard and Marsh). The Plant Patent Act of 1930 provides
protection for asexually reproduced plants.^ Intellectual protection for sexually reproduced plants is
offered by the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 in the form of 'protection certificates.' Although
these certificates are not patents (they are issued by the USDA rather than the Patent and Trademark
Office), the protection they offer is essentially the same as utility patents. This is especially true after the
^ The exclusion of sexually reproduced plants from this protection was rooted in the assumption that
sexually reproduced plants could not be propagated true-to-type. Plants patents differ from utility patents
ma number ofways. In particular, they do not require the extensive detail description demanded of
utility patents, and they are limited to a single claim (whereas a utility patent offers claims to multiple
variations of the same invention).
51995 Supreme Court decisions restricting farmers' right to resell protected seeds (Fuglie et al.).
More recent developments aimed at protecting biotechnology innovations started with the 1980
Supreme Court decision 'mDiamond vs Chakrabarty (Office ofTechnology Assessment). The end result
is that an array of genetically modified plants (both by traditional breeding methods as well as by
molecular transformations) andother living organisms are now in the statutory domain of utility patents.
Transgenic farm animals canbe expected in thenon-distant future (O'Connor), andtransgenic plants have
already been produced and patented, including theAgricetus patent pertaining to genetically engineered
cotton, Monsanto*s "roundup-ready" soybean, and, more recently, Bt comresistant to theEuropean com
borer. 4 In addition to the increased relevance ofutility patents, one should stress that trade secrets law
offers further protection of intellectual property that is relevant to plants. This isparticularly important for
hybrid varieties (virtually all com, for example), where commercialized Fi seeds ensure hybrid vigor
only for the first generation of plants. In this case the valuable 'information' is in the parent lines which
are typically not commercialized and which, as the case ofPioneer vs Holden demonstrated, can be
effectively protected bytrade secrets law (Kjeldgaard and Marsh).
From the foregoing, it is clear that agricultural innovations can be covered by intellectual property
rights that give the innovator the ability to exclude others from making, using or selling the new product
or process. Private firms that engage in agricultural R&D can therefore be expected to count on this
protection when making investment decisions. But how important is private R&D in agriculture? Table
1reports data on private and public agricultural R&D expenditures for the period 1960-1992. Whereas
both sources of research are important, since 1980 the private sector has invested more in agricultural
R&D that the public sector (which includes both USDA and land grant universities' expenditures). For
4 Here Bt stands for Bacillus thuringiensis, the bacteria that is the source of the genetic material that
makes the plant resistant to the com borer.
6the last observation year(1992), private R&D was about 30percent more than public R&D.^ Looking at
the composition of private agricultural R&D investments, it emerges that the most important area is that
of agricultural chemicals. Innovations of this kind of products (herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers)
clearly fall within the boundary of utility patents. The same holds true for agricultural machinery (whose
relative importance has declined over this observation period) and animal feed and health products. For
plant breeding research, the changing landscape of IPR law discussed above applies. The other major
area of private research is in post-harvest innovations (food processing and the like) where, again, one
would expect standard patent law to apply.^
Whereas the evidence just discussed underscores the importance of private R&D in agriculture, it
may actually underestimate its impact in terms of innovations affecting agricultural production for two
reasons. First, publicly sponsored research tends to privilege more "basic" rather than "applied"
research, as explained by Huffman and Evenson (1993, chapter 5)^ Thus, the output of considerable
publicly funded research is an input inmore applied research, and thus conceivably contributes to private
innovations protected by IPR. Second, insofar as public research is of the applied type, it can also be
patented by public organizations, and thus it isnot obvious that it ought to be treated differently than any
other proprietary discovery in our context.^ In conclusion, itseems clear that private agricultural R&D is
^ Actually, as noted by Klotz, Fuglie and Pray, table 1 may underestimate the private sector's
agricultural R&D because their data on livestock and agricultural biotechnology research was incomplete.
6 Indeed, Huffman and Evenson (1993, p. 141) report that for the period 1830-1980 only 2.5 percent
ofpost-harvest innovations were produced by public sector research.
"7 The distinction between "basic" and "applied" research dates back to Arrow.
8 The USDA always had apolicy of patenting innovations, although until 1980 it was required that
they be licensed on a non-exclusive basis. This policy changed in 1980, and it is now possible for
federally owned patents to be licensed on an exclusive basis. Since 1984 it is also possible to seek private
patents for research partially funded by the Federal government. Furthermore, in an era of declining
funding sources, land grant institutions are now aggressively pursuing the patenting of innovations from
university research. At any rate, it is afact that even for new crop varieties (traditionally an area of heavy
public research) patents and certificates are mainly owned by private firms (Fuglie, Klotz and Gill).
7fundamental to the introduction of innovations in agricultural production, and that private innovations are
bound to be protected by intellectual property rights. In what follows we show that this observation can
have fundamental implications for the measurement and interpretation of the economic benefits from
agricultural research.
Agricultural Innovations and the Input Markets
In the model we develop, agricultural production is carried out by a large number of competitive
farms that do not engage in any research activities. We consider explicitly the case of innovations for
production agriculture but not post-harvest innovations. The relevant R&D is carried out by firms that
supply inputs to the farm sector (seeds, chemicals, machinery, etc.). Thus, to realize the economic
benefits of innovations, these firms need to transfer the newtechnology to the competitive agricultural
sector. We assume that innovations take the form of new and improved versions of a given input (a
pesticide with a more effective active ingredient, an herbicide with a broader spectrum of control, a
fertilizer that is better absorbed by a given plant, a more productive seed variety, a more powerful
tractor, etc.), and that the transfer oftechnology isachieved by selling the new and improved inputs to the
competitive farm sector.
This set-up is akin to the models oftechnology diffusion through licensing that has been the object
of considerable research. In such models, however, licensing typically entails the transfer of new
technology between firms that are all engaged in final production in an oligopolistic setting (Gallini and
Winters; Katz and Shapiro, 1985), such that the option not to license is still viable for the innovating firm.
Or, when it is assumed that R&D is carried out by a research lab not engaged in production but licensing
to downstream firms (Kamien and Tauman; Katz and Shapiro, 1986), the option of licensing only to a
few firms (or only one firm) is still available, so that the strategic interaction between licensees plays an
8important role in the analysis. ^ For example, in the model ofKamien and Tauman, an innovator that
can potentially license to a competitive industry would still optimally choose to license only one firm
when the innovation is drastic. In our model, on the other hand, because of obvious features of the
agricultural production process, we assume pure competition for the downstream adopting farms, and we
assume that this structure is not affected by the introduction of innovations. Furthermore, we assume that
the innovations are embodied in inputs, such that selling the improved input is the only way for the
innovating firm to"license" its R&D output. In keeping with the foregoing discussion, it is assumed that
the innovation is protected by IPR, and that the innovating firm is the only one that can supply the new
input (and thus will price it accordingly).
Whereas the main contention ofthis paper is quite general and the qualitative results do not depend
on a particular modeling choice, to characterize the problem it is necessary to be explicit about the
specification of agricultural innovations. Thus, we assume that an agricultural commodity y can be
produced either with an old technology according Xo y=/{xq.z) or with a new technology according
Xo y=^ g(xj,z), where /(.,.) and g(.,.) are strictly concave production functions, Xq denotes the pre-
innovation input ofinterest, is the innovated input, and z represents all other inputs (for simplicityz
is treated as a scalar). Furthermore, to make the analysis tractable, it is useful to relate the new
production function to the old production function under the condition that the improved input is
measured in the same physical units as the pre-innovation input. Three obvious ways ofdoing so are:
(1) g{x],2) =f{ax^,z), a>\
Questions that have been addressed in this context include the incentive to share innovations through
licensing (Gallini and Winters; Katz and Shapiro, 1985), the effects that the possibility of licensing has
on the mcentives to innovate (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986), and the form of the optimal licensing
contract (Kamien and Tauman; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Gallini and Wright).
9(2) g{x^,z) = f{ax^,yz), {a,y) such that/(coc,;2)>/(x,z)
(3) g{x^,z) = (rf{x^,z) , a>\
Thus, (1) corresponds to the case of an innovation augmenting only the own input. This could be a
reasonable representation for, say, the case of a new version of an herbicide that has the same spectrum of
control as an existing one, but with a more effective active ingredient. Alternatively, (2) assumes that
innovation in the A:-input leads to a general factor augmentation. This could be a reasonable
representation for, say, an improved herbicide that possesses a broader spectrum of control than an
existing one, suchthat it can substitute forother inputs. Finally, in (3) the innovation in the:c-input shifts
the whole production function (a Hicks-neutral innovation). This could be a reasonable representation
for, say, a more productive seedvariety. Thesimplest wayof illustrating our contention that IPRmatter
for the purpose of evaluating R&D is bymeans of the first representation (although we stress again that
our conclusions are not predicated upon a specific representation of technological innovation). Thus, in
what follows weassume the innovation is own-input augmenting, as in equation (1).^^
In the specification chosen, a represents the efficiency ofthe improved input, so that ocj denotes
the amount of the improved input in the "efficiency units" ofthe old x-input. Once new and old inputs
are measured in the same efficiency units, the specification chosen indicates perfect substitutability
between the old and new input. In what follows we exploit this feature to simplify the analysis.
Specifically, let x represent the input of interest measured in efficiency units. Thus, for the pre-
innovation input we simply have whereas for the innovated input we have x^ =ax^.
Correspondingly, let w denote the price of the A:-input measured in efficiency units, such that we have
Note that (1) is a special case of(2). For a homogeneous production function (of any degree) (3) i_
also a special case of(2). When the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the three representations just
discussed are indistinguishable.
IS
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Wq = Wq and ^w^ja. If p denotes the price of the agricultural output and r the price of other
inputs, the profit function dual to /(•,•) is:
(4) 7r{p, w, /-) = z)- Ma - /-z •
Irrespective of whether the new or old technology is being used, output supply y and input demand (in
efficiency units) x can be retrieved via Hotelling's lemma:
(5) y =7Up{p,w,r)
(6) X =-7c^{p,w,r)
where the subscripts to 7t denote partial derivatives. Thus, for example, if farmers use the old
technology with Wq being the price of :x:o, farmers' profits are given by ^{p, with output supply
y = and input demand other hand, if farmers use the new
technology with being the price of Xp then farmers' profits are ^(p,wja^r), with output supply
y' =7rp{p,wja,r) and input demand x* =-{l/a)7r^{p,wja,r).
From this specification it is clear that the farmer will adopt the new innovation if Wj < Wq , that
is if (wi/ck) <>Vq 1 Thus, at this point the relevant question concerns the level of prices Wq and
that are likely to emerge in equilibrium. To say something about that, further assumptions are needed.
First, to close the model, letD(p) denote the (downward sloping) demand for the agricultural output.
Thus, for given input prices w and r, the agricultural output equilibrium price p' =p{'W,r) will solve:
(7) D[p'') =7tp[p\w,r)
11 Strictly, if - w^a the farmer is indifferent as to which input is used, but following standard
convention we assume that insuch a case adoption ofthe improved input occurs.
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Second, assume that both Xq and are produced with constant marginal costc, and that the price r of
other inputs is exogenously given. Thus, the profitof the firm producing the innovated input are given by
(w, -c)jc, =(u', -c/a)x,. Because the new input is protected by IPR, the innovating firm will try to
charge the profit-maximizing monopolistic price (expressed in efficiency units)w"'. More precisely, let:
(8) =
represent the derived demand (in efficiency units) for the innovated input, that is, the input demand
accountingfor equilibrium in the agricultural output market. Then the monopolistic pricew"' is:
(9) w, = argmax-j
^1 [v ^ /
Themonopolistic price in (9), however, is not feasible if the adoption constraintw, < Wq is binding.
Following Arrow, we saythat the innovation is"drastic" if the firm can charge wj", whereas it is "non-
drastic" if the innovating firm is constrained to charge the upper bound Wq < w"' In addition, in
considering the innovator's pricing decision we must account for the behavior of other firms (the
producers of Xq). Thus, the two interrelated factors that need to be considered in describing how the
price for the new innovation is determined are: (i) the previously existing market structure, and (ii)
whether the innovation is drastic (leading to unconstrained monopoly price of the innovated input) or
non-drastic (sothat the monopolist's pricing decision isconstrained bythethreat of competition). As will
be shown below, the impact of the innovation on welfare, and the measurement of the welfare change in
the agricultural markets, depend on whether the innovation is drastic or non-drastic, and on the market
Clearly, because the upper limit of the constraint is monotonically increasing in a, an
innovation ismore likely to be drastic the larger is the efficiency parameter a.
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structure that prevailed prior to the innovation. Thus, in what follows we examine all these cases
separately.
Measuring Welfare Changes for a Non-Drastic Innovation
Consider first the case of a non-drastic innovation, in which the innovating firm cannot charge its
unconstrained monopoly price w"'. The impact of the innovation on the input price involves two
separate cases: (i) the producers of the original input behave as perfect competitors (e.g., the production
of Xq involves a publicly available process); and (ii) X(, was sold at a price above marginal cost (this
latter case could occur when the new patented innovation supersedes a previously available patented
innovation that was also sold at a non-competitive price). In the latter instance, the introduction of the
innovated input x, establishes a duopoly structure in the inputmarket. As is well known, the equilibrium
outcome in such a case depends crucially on the kind of strategic game played by the duopolists (cfr.
Mas-Colell, Whinston, andGreen, chapter 12). In thispaper we assume that price is the strategic variable
of input suppliers, i.e., Bertrand competition occurs. This assumption is consistent with ourprevious one
that incumbent and innovating firms both have identical and constant marginal cost c, and it is arguably
appealing for the problem at hand (the diffusion of new technology that has already been produced). In
some sense, the Bertrand competition assumption is also the conservative one. Assuming Coumot
behavior would yield lower social benefits from innovations, implying that the overestimate of actual
returns obtained by using the conventional method (illustrated later) would be even larger.
If the pre-innovation input Xq is also patented and sold at a price exceeding marginal cost, the
innovation supplants a previous one. This is what Schumpeter called the process of "creative
destruction." In such a case, an effect of the innovation is to redistribute monopoly rents, as well as
introducing a superiorproduct.
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Innovation with initial competitive inputpricing
When the input of interest is initially competitively priced, then Wq—c. Hence, the new input
price is constrained to satisfy w, < c(that is, w^<ac). As previously indicated, if a is not too large,
this pricing constraint is likely to bind, so that we will have w^^cec (hence, the innovation is non-
drastic). In this case, the efficiency price of the input will be unchanged by the innovation (i.e.,
= Wq = c). Since the farmers' profits, and output, depend upon output price and the price w of the
effective input, and not upon the measure of technology directly, the post-innovation and pre-innovation
supply curves coincide and the farmers' profit (producer surplus) is unchanged by the innovation. What
is happening is that the increase in efficiency due to the innovation, ceteris paribus, shifts the supply
curve rightward but the concomitant increase in factor price shifts the supply curve backward so that
overall there is no change. As illustrated in figure 2, the relevant post-innovation supply curve in this
case is S^{p) =y(^p,w^la,r^, were Wj/a = Wq . Because the effective price of inputs is unchanged,
producers and consumers of agricultural products are unaffected by the innovation.
The actual (gross) social gains, for this case, are given by the profits earned by the monopolist
because originally (under the competitive constant cost assumption) input producers earned no surplus,
and because there is no change in surplus for producers or consumers of agricultural products. Hence,
the welfare gain ofa non-drastic innovation when the pre-innovation input is competitively priced is:
(10) c
V aj
>0
where - ~nJ^p{c,r\c,r) is the demand in efficiency units for the newjc-input (the level ofwhich i
not changed by the innovation, i.e., x, = ). As long as the innovation is non-drastic, the gains in (10)
increase with the innovation (but ata decreasing rate, i.e., AiSfF '^^ is concave in a).
IS
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In measuring the social gains it is interesting to note that, under the assumption of constant
marginal costs in the input market, our factor-augmenting innovation is isomorphic to a decrease in the
>:-input unit cost, i.e., we have a supply shift in the input market. Now, in general it is not possible to
compute the total welfare effects of a supply shift in the input market by measuring the change of
Marshallian surplus in the market for the output which employs that input. In the special case of
constant marginal costs considered here, however, the welfare gains fi"om such an input supply shift could
in fact be measured in the output market if inputswere competitively priced (because there is no surplus
that accrues to input producers). Thus, our inability to measure the total welfare effect of the innovation
as a change in surplus in the agricultural output market here is solely due to the monopoly pricing in the
input market which is made possible by the existence of IPR.
Innovationwithpre-existing monopoly in the inputmarket
If originally there is monopoly power in the inputmarket, then the new innovation (even if it is
non-drastic) will affect the input price (in efficiency units) and hence will lead to changes in surplus in
the agricultural market. If we let Wq > c denote themonopoly price priorto the innovation, thenunder
Bertrand competition the innovator's pricing decision is still constrained by w, < ac (that is, Wj <c),
because the original monopolist will be willing to reduce price to c before giving up the entire market to
the innovating firm. For a non-drastic innovation we will then have w, = c. Thus, the innovation leads
to a decrease in efficiency price for the input, an increase in the use of the input when measured in
efficiency units (jT; > Xq ), and an increase in surplus in the agricultural market. It is interesting to note
14 The change in surplus measured in the output market would be equivalent to the change in "(
surplus" associated with the derived demand for the input whose supply has shifted (Just and Hueth).
But this is only apartial measure ofthe overall welfare effect ifthe input supply is upward sloping,
because in such acase the change in rents accruing to the producers ofthis input must also be taken into
account. This point is explicitly illustrated in the next section.
consumer
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that even if the new "innovation" is less efficient than the old one (a < 1), it may still lead to a price
reduction (in efficiency units), and thus increase measured surplus in the agricultural market, because the
initial monopolist must lower price to maintain his market. Essentially, the new innovation, while
dominated, reduces the market power of the monopolist and will have some social value, though (again)
this will not be properly measured in the final product market.
To illustrate more precisely what the surplus in the agricultural market measures, assume the
indirect utility function of consumers isquasilinear(suchthatMarshallian surplus is an exact measure of
welfare), that is V{p,l) = I +v(/7), where as before p is the price of agricultural products and I is
consumers' income. By Roy's identity, the demand for agricultural output is then D{^p) =-v'(/7). Total
surplus (socialwelfare) beforeand after the innovation are givenby:
(11) SW^={l+v(po)}+7r{p^,WQ,r) +[w^ -c)xl
(12) SW^ "[^+v{Pi)} +^{Pi,Cyr) + c
V ay
A*
where Po=p(wQ,r), pi=p(c,r) (and thus Pi<Po because Wq>c), x] =-;r^{p^,c,r), and
•^0 - equations (11) and (12) the first term within braces on the RHS is the consumer
surplus, the second is agricultural producer surplus, and the last is the input supplier's monopoly profit.
Note that the first two terms do not depend directly on the innovation, but only on efficiency prices.
Thus, the change in social welfare when a non-drastic innovation supersedes an existing monopoly,
defined as =SWi-SWq, can be expressed as - AM5+ATI^,where AMS denotes
changes in Marshallian Surplus in the agricultural market and AIl'^ denotes changes in monopoly profit
in the input market. More specifically:
(13) AMS ={v(pi) - v(/>o)} + ,c, ?•) - ,r)
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where the first set of braces on the RHS contains changes in consumer surplus and the second set of
braces contains changes in farmers' profit (producer surplus). This change in surplus in the agricultural
market can be measured, in the conventionalway, by the change in area between the supply curve (which
shifts due to the innovation and the input price change) and the demand curve. Thus, this change isgiven
by area ABEF in figure 2 because the relevant post-innovation supply curve in this case is
were w^la<WQ (but note that we are still dealing with a non-drastic
innovation, and that thedecline in efficiency input price here is due to the increased competition for the
pre-existing monopoly). As for the distribution ofMarshallian surplus, whereas consumer surplus
increases dueto the innovation (because < p^), producer surplus need not increase if the demand for
agricultural output is inelastic.
The change in monopoly profits associated with the innovation is:
(14) An^ = c
V CCj
This change in monopoly profits in the input market cannot be measured in the output market. Note that
for cc = l (& small innovation) monopoly profits must fall due to the innovation because of the increased
competition in the input market, and thus in such a case the change in surplus in the final goods market
(even when correctly measured as area ABEF in figure 2) would overstate the true value of the
innovation. Indeed, the innovation embodied in could have social value even if or <1 (which means
that, strictly, it is not a technological improvement) because it would alleviate the monopoly distortion.
Although in such a case the "innovation" in a:, would not be adopted, its development would lead to an
increase in overall surplus, which will be overmeasured in the final goods market since this measurement
Indeed, the interested reader can verify that, in the special case of a homogeneous agricultural
production function (of degree < 1), agricultural producers will gain from the innovation if, and only if,
final demand is elastic.
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does not reflect the decline in monopoly rents.
The total welfare change due to a non-drastic innovation is perhaps best illustrated in the input
market, as in figure 3, where is the derived demand for the:c-input defined earlier (the other curve
in figure 3 is the innovator-monopolist's marginal revenue curve associated with this derived demand).
Now, changes in the Marshallian surplus in the agricultural market can be represented as:
(15) """
where the second equality follows if market equilibrium in the, agricultural market holds, such that
p = p{w,r) [recall that is demand and is supply]. Hence, the change in
Marshallian surplus in the agricultural marketcan be expressed as:
Wo
(16) hMS=
c
In other words, the change inMarshallian surplus in the agricultural market can bemeasured as the area
next to the derived demand (in efficiency units) for the input in question. Hence, area ABEF in figure 2
is equal to area (a+b+d) in figure 3. But clearly this does not represent the entire welfare change, as the
variation in monopoly profits needs to be accounted for. In terms offigure 3, the change in monopoly
profits is given by area (e+f+g) minus area
Figure 3also makes itclear that anon-drastic innovation ofsize a leads to larger social gains when a
pre-existing monopoly initially prevails than when pure competition initially prevails (that is,
the larger gains being essentially due to the increase in;c-input use. In particular.
The situation of anon-drastic innovation when competition initially prevails, discussed earlier, can
be illustrated in figure 3as well. In such acase, both pre- and post-innovation input levels equal Xj*, and
the welfare gains isgiven by area (e+f+g).
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when the innovation replaces an existing monopoly, the additional welfare gain is equal to area d.
Measuring Welfare Changes for a Drastic Innovation
The other possible case is one in which the innovator's optimal price is unconstrained by the
potential competition, that is w"' <ca (equivalently, w"' <c). In this instance, the original market
structure does not affect the price charged for the innovated input. Clearly, here there is an impact in the
agricultural market because of the decline in price (in efficiency units) of the input. Analytically, the
decline in efficiency price of theA:-input leads to higher output and lower price in the agricultural market.
Whether farmers gainor loseremains problematic, depending (largely) upon the elasticity of demand for
the final product. Again, however, thetotal welfare effect cannot be measured in the output market alone
because thechanges in rents accruing to input suppliers arenotrepresented in thatmarket.
When competition in the input market prevails prior to the innovation, the welfare gain from a
drastic innovation is given by:
(17) =\z{w)dw+
^ aor /
where W', <c. The first term in the RHS of represents the change ofMarshallian surplus in the
agricultural market. This change is due to the decline in the price (in efficiency units) of the innovated
input, and can be measured in the final output market as area ABEF in figure 2. The total welfare effects
of the innovation, however, must account also for the input suppliers' profit, and are best illustrated in
the innovated input market, as in figure 4. Here, area {e+f+g+K) represents the change in the final
output's Marshallian surplus (and thus it is equivalent to area ABEF in figure 2), whereas the
monopolists' profit is given by area
When the innovating firm replaces an existing monopoly, the welfare gain from adrastic innovation
is given by:
Again, the first term in the RHS of(18) represents the change ofMarshallian surplus in the agricultural
market. This change can be measured as area ABEF in figure 2 or as area {a+b-\-d+e+f+g+h) in figure 4.
The total welfare effects of the innovation, however, must account also for the change in the input
suppliers' profit, which are given by area (/+/+A:+m+w) minus area {a+b) in figure 4 (this difference
could be negative). Note that, because:
(19) J ^(^0 -
c
then, as for the case of non-drastic innovation, the welfare gain from a drastic innovation will in general
be larger if the innovating firm replaces an existing monopoly.
Comparison with Conventional Analysis: An Example
A common feature of virtually all previous empirical analyses is that they start with a measure of
the shift in productivity brought about by technological innovations, estimated either by including R&D
and related expenditures directly in an aggregate production function or in an agricultural supply function
(see the studies reviewed by Alston, Norton, and Pardey). Neglecting for the moment the numerous
estimation problems that such an endeavor necessarily entails, it would seem that the shif^ in the
agricultural supply function due to innovations can be correctly identified regardless of the industry
structure ofthe innovating industry. For example, for the model that we have analyzed, computation of
multifactor productivity measures before and af^er the innovation would identify the supply shift fromiSo
to 5"] of figure 1. Similarly, under certain identification conditions, estimation ofan agricultural supply
response with R&D variables on the right-hand-side could again correctly identify such productivity
\ cc^
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shift. 1*7 But, as explained at length earlier, what the conventional framework fails to do is to account for
the fact that the introduction of agricultural innovations will typicallyresult in changed equilibrium input
prices (in addition to output price adjusting as in figure 1). Thus, the conventional approach is unlikely
to provide a solid framework to evaluate the benefits from private research that is covered byIPR.
Having shown that the conventional method of evaluating the benefits from agricultural R&D is
not appropriate for this model, onemayask by how much conventional estimates of R&D benefits differ
from the correctone. Clearly, it is not possible to provide a singleanswerto this question. Although it is
evident that the competitive model is not appropriate, which particular 'noncompetitive' model is
adequate will depend on the specific type of innovation, as well as on the existingmarket structure prior
to the innovation. Thus, ftiture research may adapt the conceptual model discussed here to specific
agricultural innovations, accounting for their particular technological features and institutional setting.
However, to gain some insights into the parameters that are likely to affect the differences in welfare
evaluation that may arise between the conventional framework and our framework, we consider an
explicit parameterization of the theoretical model analyzed so far.
For this parametric model, suppose that the farmers' technology displays Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) between the innovated A;-input and other inputs, and that there are decreasing returns
to scale (supply is upward sloping). In other words, the profit function of the agricultural industry is:
(20) 7t{p, iv,r) = Ap^*'^ +r
n
J-o" \-a
where^ > 0 is a scaling parameter, 7 > 0 is the (constant) farm supply elasticity, and cr> 0 is
the (constant) elasticity of substitution between the two farm inputs. The parameter /3>() determines
Aswehave shown, the innovated input price will usually change as a resultof innovations. Thus, to
estimate the separate response of supply toR&D conditional onall input prices one needs additional
sources of exogenous movements in the input prices so that the innovated input price series and the
sequenceofR&D expenditures are not perfectly correlated.
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the x-input share of total costs (clearly, this share depends on input prices). Hence, for a given p the a:-
input demand is more elastic the higher a. Agricultural output supply and input demand are easily
derived from (20) via Hotelling's lemma. To close the model we specify a constant elasticity final
demand, viz:
(21) D{p) = Bp"
where £ >0 is a scaling parameter and £* > 0 is the (constant) elasticity of demand (expressed as a
positive number). The equilibrium output price therefore is:
(22) p[<v,r) = B
1^41+77)
The monopolist's derived demand for the improved A:-input expressed in efficiency units is
1+7 Sri hi g(»7+g)-g(i+7)
(23) x{w) = +
(^+ff)(l-CT)
The monopolist sets w* to maximizes profits, subject to the competitive price limit. This results in the
followingprice for the improved;c-input (in efficiencyunits):
0{w,)
(24) w, = l+0{w,)
/ \
c if^(w',*)<-l and \i\ <c
otherwise
where 0{w) is the own-price elasticity ofthe derived input demand in equation (23), that is:
£(! + ;?)(25) 0{w) = -a-+ G-
{•n+s)
Pw'-" Aw'-'+r'
t1
Hence, for given parameter values we can compute the equilibrium solution and the welfare
measures before and after the innovation, both with the conventional method aswell aswith our approach
described earlier (note that w, cannot be computed analytically, but needs to be solved for numerically).
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Table 2 reports some simulation results for alternative parameter values. In this table, we start by setting
c = r = 1, and choosethe arbitraryconstants AandB suchthat the pre-innovation equilibrium has /?= 1
and ^ = 10,000 (all of these normalizations are inconsequential for the relevant results of the
simulations). Furthermore, we set /? = 0.1 (this implies that the cost shareof the A:-input is approximately
0.09 in the initial competitive equilibrium). Given these assumptions, four parameterswill determine the
equilibrium solution and the welfare effects of the innovation: the final demand elasticity (f), the
N
agricultural supply elasticity the x-input demand elasticity (controlled by the elasticity of
substitution cr), and the magnitude ofthe innovation (cr).
To understand the effects of these various parameters, in table 2 we first analyze a given
innovation with a = 1.2. Holding a constant, we consider two different values for each of the three
remaining parameters and cr). For each combination ofthe parameter values that we consider,
table 2 first reports the computed welfare changes for final consumers (AGS) and farmers {APS)
calculated with the conventional method (essentially area. ABCD in figure 1, except that with our
functional forms the farm supply curves are borne in the origin). In the conventional framework,
consumers always benefit from the innovation, whereas farmers benefit when final demand is elastic and
lose when final demand is inelastic (a necessary implication ofourhomothetic production structure). The
next three columns oftable 2 report the welfare effects ofthe innovations on final consumers (ACS),
farmers (APS), and input suppliers (AH'^ ), computed according to the true model. It is clear that an
important element of the alternative solutions is whether or not the upper limit c on the monopolistic
price is binding, and for a given a this condition depends crucially on the elasticity ofderived factor
demand 0 (which is controlled by cr). The competitive price limit here is binding for lower values of
the elasticity of substitution (cr =Oi and cr =3), whereas it is not binding for the larger value of this
elasticity. As discussed earlier, when the competitive limit is binding, there are no welfare changes for
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farmers and final consumers, and all the gross benefits of research take the form of profits for the
innovating input suppliers. On the other hand, when the competitive price limit is not binding, then
consumers will benefit from the innovation. Whether farmers benefit or not again depends on the
elasticity of final demand. The true welfare changes for consumers and farmers, however, are smaller
than those indicated by the conventional approach. Thus, for example, when farmers gain from the
innovation they gain less than that indicated by the conventional approach, but when they are hurt by the
innovation they also lose less than that indicated by the conventional method.
To look at the overall social welfare effects of the innovation, one needs to add the profit of input
suppliers, which are also reported in table 2. Clearly, all of these welfare measures are meaningful only
when compared across the two methods, because their absolute value depends on the arbitrary
normalization chosen. Thus, the last column of table 2 reports the ratio of total welfare gains measured
in the conventional way to the actual total welfare gains according to the true model. Given that the
initial condition is the competitive model, and that the conventional model (incorrectly, for our model)
postulates competition for the post-innovation equilibrium as well, the conventional model must
overestimate the benefits from innovation and thus this ratio should be greater thanone inour setting.
From table 2 it is clear that, for the welfare comparisons that we are interested in, the crucial
parameter is theelasticity of substitution (which here essentially determines the elasticity of the innovated
input's derived demand). To understand this point it is useful to refer back to figure 3, which illustrates
thewelfare effectsof a non-drastic innovation. Forsuch a case, the conventional method would measure
total welfare changes as area {e+f+g+h) whereas by accounting for the monopoly position of the
innovating firm we measure it asarea (e+/+g). Thus, the welfare overmeasurement by the conventional
approach is given by area h. Clearly, as the derived demand becomes more elastic at the point x{^)»
the welfare overmeasurement by the conventional method will increase (for any given size cx of
innovation).
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From table 2 it is also clear that the elasticity of supply affects mostly the consumer surplus
whereas the elasticity of final demand affects mostly the benefits to farmers (for the true model this only
applies for drastic innovations). In any case, neither £ nor 77 seem to have much of an effect on the
ratio of welfare measures as shown in the last column. Having illustrated this point, in table 3 we
concentrate on the role of the elasticity of substitution <7 and of the innovation parameter a. These two
parameters are allowed to take three different values each, whereas the other two parameters are held at a
value intermediate between those considered earlier, that is ^ = 1 and Tj = l. From the results reported
in table 3, it appears that the crucial factor is again the elasticity of the derived demand for the improved
input. For any given size a of the innovation, the overestimate of the conventional welfare measures
relative to the true ones increasemonotonicallywith the elasticity of derived demand for thex input. On
the other hand, for any given cr, the ratio in the last column of table 3 increases monotonically with the
size of the innovation a only as long as the innovation is non-drastic. It is noteworthy that even for a
relatively small innovation size (a = l.l), the overestimate ofthe conventional welfare measures relative
to the true ones can be as much as 50 percent for the larger value of cr that we considered. Overall, for
the range of parameters considered in tables 2 and 3, the conventional measure overestimates true welfare
gains by as littleas 3 percentand by as much as 61 percent.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that rapid increases in agricultural productivity have had significant
consequences for farmers, as well as for all the upstream and downstream participants in the
agricultural and food sector, including final consumers. There is a significant body of research that
indicates these increases in productivity can be attributed to past research and development efforts.
What is perhaps more debatable is how to appropriately measure the welfare benefits that are
attributable to these innovations. Private innovators, endowed with the IPR protection provided by the
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legal system, will attempt to capture the benefits due to their innovation through monopoly pricing. As
we have shown m this paper, this means that the conventional welfare measures that apply to publicly
produced innovations will not be appropriate in these circumstances, and in general will tend to
overstate the true benefits attributable to the innovations. Although this is an important conclusion, it
should be noted that the most dramatic implication of correctly accounting for the monopolistic behavior
entailed by IPR is not on the overall size of the benefits, but on the distribution of the welfare gains from
innovations. In particular, for innovations introduced by suppliers of agricultural inputs, we find that
what is conventionally measured as benefits to consumers and agricultural producers could in fact be
totally captured by the innovating firms.
In this paper we have stressed that the correct evaluation of the benefits from R&D aimed at
agriculture needs to account for the relevant institutional and industry structure responsible for the actual
development of technological innovations. The recognition that agriculwral innovations lead to non-
competitive markets has other implications that may deserve further study. For example, the rapidity
with which innovations will be adopted by potential users is likely to depend upon the market structure
and pricing decisions of firms. Furthermore, the presence ofmonopolistic behavior due to pastpatented
innovations is likely to affect the types of innovations that are pursued; the existing distortion means
that the private and social values of various potential innovations may differ significantly. Finally, the
innovators' incentive to disseminate an innovation to other potential users, such as agriculmral
producers in foreign countries, may conflict with private national benefits associated with the
dissemination of such technology.
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Table 1. U.S. Annual Public and Private Agricultural R&D
Millions of current dollars
Private R&D
Plant Agncultural Farm Animal Food & Total
Breeding Chemicals Maciiinery Health Kindred Private
Products R&D
Total
Public
R&D
1960 6 27 75 6 92 206 216
1970 26 98 89 45 206 464 448
1980 97 395 363 111 488 1,453 1,214
1990 314 1,127 360 . 245 965 3,012 2,380
1992 400 1,279 394 306 1,038 3,416 2,605
Sources: (a) Klotz, Fuglie, and Pray, Table 8
(b) Alston and Pardey, Tables 2-A3
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Table 2. Simulated Welfare Changes for CES Model, a = 12
Conventional Method True Model Ratio^^^
£ V (j (0) ACS APS ACS APS An^
0.5 0.5 0.5 (-0.5) 79 -26 0 0 51 1.05
3 0.5 0.5 (-0.6) 23 30' 0 0 51 1.05
0.5 3 0.5 (-0.5) 136 -17 0 0 114 1.05
3 3 0.5 (-0.6) 80 40 0 0 114 1.06
0.5 0.5 3 (-2.8) 98 -33 0 0 51 1.29
3 0.5 3 (-2.8) 28 37 0 0 51 1.30
0.5 3 3 (-2.8) 167 -21 0 0 114 1.29
3 3 3 (-2.9) 99 50 0 0 114 1.31
0.5 0.5 9 (-7.9) 163 -54 26 -9 54 1.54
3 0.5 9 (-8.0) 47 63 8 10 54 1.54
0.5 3 9 (-7.9) 279 -35 44 -5 120 1.54
3 3 9 (-8.1) 167 83 28 14 121 1.54
(a) ratio of welfare gains measured by the conventional method to total welfare gains of the true
model.
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Tables. Simulated Welfare Changes for CESModel, £ = l and tj=1
Conventional Method True Model Ratio
a (0) a ACS APS ACS APS An^
0.5 (-0.5) 1.1 42 0 0 0 41 1.03
3 (-2.8) 1.1 47 0 0 0 41 1.14
9 (-8.3) 1.1 62 0 0 0 41 1.50
0.5 (-0.5) 1.2 80 0 0 0 76 1.05
3 (-2.8) 1.2 98 0 0 0 76 1.29
9 (-8.0) 1.2 164 0 26 0 80 1.54
0.5 (-0.5) 1.4 142 0 0 0 130 1.09.
3 (-2.8) 1.4 209 0 0 0 130' 1.61
9 (-6.7) 1.4 507 0 153 0 215 1.38
(a) ratio of welfare gains measured by the conventional method to total welfare gains of the true model.
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